Accounting and Taxation for Paralegals

Book Description

Designing Innovations in Industrial Logistics Modelling describes practical methods for approaching the task of designing industrial logistics systems. It surveys the development of logistics models and their application in manufacturing to designing, planning, and implementing the movement of supplies, equipment, and products. This text/reference book discusses the combination of operation and production research to obtain solutions for designing and integrating advanced logistics systems. It provides the reader with a set of prescriptive and descriptive models and methods that have been developed exclusively for the purpose of designing, managing, and optimizing the architecture of such advanced systems. The design and application of new tools and methods is presented in such a way that emphasizes the competitiveness of manufacturing industries, and case studies are presented in a manner that demonstrates successful models and methods in advanced industrial logistics systems. In addition, Designing Innovations in Industrial Logistics Modelling explains the various formal tools and methodologies employed in evaluating new programs and covers program management and dynamic evaluation techniques.

Book Description

Written for geodesists using computers of modest capacity, the book reviews the latest development in geodetic computation techniques. The aim is to take stock of available data (datums, ellipsoids, units etc.), to focus on applications and to illuminate spatial developments. Topics cover datums and reference systems, geodetic arc distances, different projections and coordinate systems. The material has been specially chosen and covers the practical aspect of geodesy, including the demonstration of global examples. Stressing the how-to-do approach, the book is of interest to students in geodesy, GIS consultants, hydrographers and land surveyors.

Book Description

Nuclear technology in all countries of the world is subject to controls from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to prevent its misuse for military purposes. Recently these controls (or "safeguards") have come under criticism for lack of effectiveness, and the IAEA has now elaborated a strengthened safeguards system reaching deep into the domains of national sovereignty. Problems and prospects of the new system are discussed in this book by a team of German and international scholars, practitioners and officials.

Book Description

A global history of U.S. nuclear espionage from its World War II origins to today's threats from rogue states.

For fifty years, the United States has monitored friends and foes who seek to develop the ultimate weapon. Since 1952 the nuclear club has grown to at least eight nations, while others are making serious attempts to join. Each chapter chronologically focuses on the nuclear activities of one or more countries, intermingling what the United States believed was happening with accounts of what actually occurred in each country's laboratories, test sites, and decision-making councils. Jeffrey T. Richelson weaves recently declassified documents into his interviews with the scientists and spies involved in the nuclear espionage. The book reveals new information about U.S. intelligence work on the Soviet/Russian, French, Chinese, Indian, Israeli, and South African nuclear programs; on the attempts to solve the mysterious Vela Incident; and on current efforts to uncover the nuclear secrets of Iran and North Korea. The book also includes spy satellite photographs never before extracted from the national archives. 46 photographs, 6 maps.

Customer Reviews:

US intelligence on a nuclear bomb........2007-03-21

I confess that I think the spread of nuclear weapons is inevitable. To make a nuclear bomb all you need is 1940s technology. In time more and more nations will get them. At best, the US can try to slow down the growth. To do that they need accurate intelligence. What is critical is before they get the bomb as later it is much harder to stop it. Reading this book I did not feel confident the US intelligence was that successful in finding out this information. Partly it is asking too much of an intelligence agency for example it is clear from the book that few in the countries that are trying to make bombs know or even suspect it. The cost is not that high. It appears the local intelligence is these countries is adequate in security. It does not take that much time to make one if a country wants too. It is also clear for all the technological marvels available to the US they do not enough. Although it does appear the US often knows a bomb has gone off after it has gone off.

What I did not like is the book lacks an overall assessment at the end of each section. So I felt like we are going from story to story with no real theme.

However it is a good study and if your interested in this subject it is a must read.

How We Know.......2006-09-09

This is a detailed study of what we know about the different atomic weapons holdings and development efforts and how we obtained that knowledge. Jeffrey Richelson describes all the development efforts from war-time Germany to Iran and North Korea today. He particularly brings across the importance of the different airborne and satellite surveillance programs, showing how the need for airplane over-flights diminished as higher and higher resolution imagery became available from the KH series reconnaissance satellites.

This is an exhaustive effort and well documented with 122 pages of notes that left me with an appreciation for the problem of information gathering when dealing with nuclear proliferation.

The Definitive History of Nuclear Espionage.......2006-08-08

Dr. Jeffrey T. Richelson, arguably the most prolific and certainly the most technically correct writer about the U.S. intelligence community, has done it again. "Spying on the Bomb" describes, in Dr. Richelson's usual thorough and well-researched manner, the U.S. intelligence community's efforts to track--and influence--other nations' attempts to develop nuclear weapons.

Dr. Richelson begins his story in Nazi Germany during World War II. Hitler, as it turned out, did not have a meaningful atomic bomb program, despite the worrisome presence in the Third Reich of renowned nuclear physicist Dr. Werner Heisenberg, who was certainly capable of designing one. After the War, the Soviet Union was the second nation to join the "nuclear club," detonating a fission bomb in 1949, years earlier than the "experts" had predicted. Today the nuclear club includes, for sure, Britain, China, France, India, Israel, Pakistan and South Africa. The evidence concerning North Korea and Taiwan is ambiguous (they probably have small nuclear arsenals), and Iran could join the club at any time. Dr. Richelson describes the nuclear programs of all of these nations at great length, as well as the efforts of countries such as Libya which tried and failed to get nuclear weapons by purchasing them.

He also describes the many types of technological sensors that the U.S. used to detect nuclear weapon tests anywhere on the earth or in near-earth space, and to determine the characteristics of those that were tested. The U.S. deployed global arrays of seismic, acoustic, optical, radiation and electromagnetic sensors to detect nuclear bursts. For each test, the Air Force flew specially modified aircraft into the downwind radioactive cloud to "sniff" particles of the weapon debris, from which analysts could determine many details about the weapon type and design. These sensors, naturally, were only useful "after the fact." Unfortunately, they could not reveal that a nuclear test was GOING to happen, only that one HAD happened. To try to figure out IF and WHEN nations were going to test before they did so, the U.S. used other assets--photographic reconnaissance and electronic eavesdropping satellites, human agents ("spies") and diplomacy. The U.S. intelligence community's post-test analyses of other nations' nuclear tests were usually quite timely and accurate. But its record of correctly predicting "if" and "when" nuclear tests were going to take place was dismal. Virtually every foreign nuclear test was a surprise to U.S. analysts in one way or another. Their predictions of test dates, locations, bomb types, designs, fissionable materials, yields, etc., were often so far off the mark as to be worse than useless. The record of failure is so appalling that one wonders why analysts bothered to keep making predictions when they turned out to be so wrong so often.

Long after I have forgotten the technical and operational details that Dr. Richelson describes in "Spying on the Bomb," I will remember three main points.

One is that EVERY nation that today possesses nuclear weapons has lied about its intention to develop them. EVERY nuclear nation once protested that either "we are NOT going to develop nuclear weapons" or "our nuclear research is for peaceful purposes only." Then they went right ahead and developed the bomb. With the historical perspective that Dr. Richelson offers in this book, which might as well be entitled "Lying About the Bomb," I can't imagine how ANYONE can put any stock whatsoever in the promises of foreign leaders that they will not build atomic bombs. Such promises, in fact, should be considered insults.

Another related point is that treaties are useless. Dr. Richelson does not explicitly say this--it is more of an "exercise for the reader." But he tells of several nations that signed the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or other agreements to refrain from developing atomic weapons in exchange for trade rights or economic aid, and then went right ahead and did what they wanted to do--build atomic bombs. Such treaties, in fact, may do more harm than good. If diplomats or analysts believe falsely that a nation is abiding by the terms of a treaty, they may not react quickly enough when evidence accumulates that the nation is simply ignoring the pretty words on the piece of paper.

The third point, related to the U.S. intelligence community's consistent failure to accurately predict the nuclear activities of non-U.S. nations, has to do with a certain "technological arrogance." In the examples that Dr. Richelson cites, U.S. analysts seem to think that most other nations lack the scientific, engineering and manufacturing skills required to design and build an atomic bomb. The record clearly belies that assumption. They also seem to assume that every other nation MUST proceed along the same nuclear path that the U.S. took. But counter-examples abound. For example, U.S. analysts ASSUMED that any nation developing an atomic bomb would use plutonium for the fissionable material. China, however, shocked U.S. analysts by using highly enriched uranium instead of plutonium. Similarly, many analysts smugly assume that certain isotope separation techniques are "obsolete." But just because the U.S. does not use them today does not mean they are not perfect for some other less-advanced nascent nuclear nation.

U.S. intelligence community analysts seem to lack a real-world appreciation for the importance of innovation, cleverness and adaptability, on which the U.S. does not have a monopoly, in the nuclear weapon development process. This short-sightedness has repeatedly led them, and the nation, to be unpleasantly surprised by foreign nuclear developments.

A fascinating account on what our activities and capabilities have been in discovering the development of nuclear weapons........2006-07-04

Jeffrey T. Richelson chronicles the efforts the United States has made to deal with the threat of atomic and nuclear weapons from they were first conceived in the 1930s and `40s through the gathering of intelligence. You know, spying. The building of our own (the United States') nuclear arsenal is well chronicled in other books. This volume is more about the kinds of methods that were developed in the human intelligence and technical intelligence areas and the debates that have raged over the decades in interpreting the meaning of what was found out. I found the gradual growth of the intelligence bureaucracy and how each component of the CIA versus the State Department versus the Military became predictable in its interpretation of evidence of nuclear activity fascinating and distressing. It is hard to have confidence that our nation is getting a handle on the threats facing us when intelligence interpretation is more about turf wars than truly understanding what is happening in the laboratories and processing plants of our enemies.

While the book does discuss the development of sampling the atmosphere for the minute quantities of by products unique to nuclear activity and the particles that are the residue of a nuclear explosion, the acoustic infrasonic signatures of nuclear blasts, the satellite detection of light signatures, gamma ray production, photographic evidence of infrastructure and activities signaling the enrichment of uranium or the collection and processing of plutonium through flyovers by spy planes and specialized satellites, it also discusses the problems associated with gathering human intelligence in the various regimes. Even when you get evidence from someone on the ground, one has to not only verify the validity of the information provided, but also consider carefully the motives of the person supplying the information. It becomes a very complicated series of issues very quickly.

Adding to the difficulty is that those who desire to develop these weapons usually want to do so in great secrecy until they successfully explode a nuclear device. They have learned a lot about the capabilities of our satellites and the habits of interpretation by our intelligence services. So, they design their facilities to look as much like something legitimate as they can. They take facilities underground. They build decoys that look hidden, but are designed to hold attention. At times, they are even good enough to fool the watchdogs that come on site to inspect. For example, in the old days, inspectors measured the total radiation of fuel rods being shipped. One Asian country wanting enriched uranium got around this by building fuel rods of the proper weight and size and radiation, but using smaller pieces of enriched uranium spaced with aluminum filler. Another shaped the dirt covering the blast site (to ensure no radiation escaped into the atmosphere) so that it looked as if was created by the prevailing wind so the satellite photo interpreters would be less likely to pick up on it.

Obviously, I can't recount everything that is covered in 544 pages. However, the last three chapters do cover current events with Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. The author shows clearly how the present administration was not served well by competition between intelligence services. I found the discussion of the infamous aluminum tubes quite enlightening. Iraq orders 60,000 extremely engineered aluminum tubes. Why? One analyst at the CIA sees them as centrifuge tubes. He even tests them as such and finds a way to make one spin at high enough rpms to function as one. Other agencies point out that the proportions are wrong for centrifuge tubes and they are indeed similar to the missile bodies Iraq had used in the past. However, the tubes are too hard and the tolerances are overly precise for rockets. Is Iraq simply living with inefficiency to get away with enriching uranium? Or was Saddam himself the victim of his own agencies? Did he order the program restarted, and his crooked bureaucrats ordered these things to make him think they were doing something but secretly benefiting themselves somehow?

Who knows. All the certainty you here from various parties is evidence of their political position rather than any real expertise in intelligence analysis.

What I come away with is a sense that we really do need to reform our intelligence services to make sure we are focused on gathering intelligence and interpreting it as well as we can with as few turf wars and bureaucratic wrangling as we can. The daunting task is that the reforms have to be done by the same bureaucrats who are fighting over power and turf now. Who wants to give up power? And just because one group wins over another in no way indicates that the better and more reliable group won the fight. It simply means that the better political infighter was rewarded.

Some say that we are too focused on nuclear weapons. That a single nuclear weapon cannot take down the United States. While that is likely true, it isn't the direct assault that is the real threat for America. It is if a bomb goes off in a place and in a way that draws America into a war the way the Allies were all drawn into World War I through a seemingly small act. We have to be focused on these nations and what they are up to on this front. Of course, we must do the other things, too. Nobody said being a Superpower was easy work. Of course, nations will act in their own interests. What is interesting, and adds to the complexities, is how the political factions within each nation (including ours) will interpret, leak, and promote various activities contrary the plans of those in power. From what we have seen leaked to the press in the past few years, it appears that our own intelligence bureaucracies are rife with this contrarian activity.

A fascinating and informative work. You cannot consider yourself informed on this subject by what you hear and read in the mainstream media. This book is certainly one you should read. And the background it will give you will help you decipher sense from nonsense when you hear someone talking about nuclear issues on the tube.

Tell Tale Mushroom Clouds.......2006-05-22

This is a meticulously researched book that provides what seems to be an accurate chronicle of the efforts by the U.S. Government to gather intelligence on the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is a good source book and a good introduction to the issues associated with identifying and tracking the development of nuclear weapons. It is however a long way from being a definitive book on the subject.

The story of the proliferation nuclear weapons is a complex one involving the international transfer of weapons related knowledge, technology (such as advanced machine tools), and raw materials from nation states possessing one or more of these ingredients to those wishing to posses them. It further involves the development of the scientific and engineering human capital required to design and run a nuclear program by nuclear wannabe states. Finally there is the construction and location of the necessary production and testing facilities needed for such programs. Richelson would have better served his readers had he opened his book with a tutorial on this complex story so that they could better understand what American intelligence was really looking for in the events he chronicles.

This book would have also been better had Richelson made more of an effort to tie the individual events he chronicles so well into a common theme. As is, each event he recounts exists more or less in isolation from every other event without any indication of the evolution of either of nuclear weapons development or of the efforts to produce intelligence on the subject.

Still this is a remarkable book that provides a wealth of details on both nuclear weapons development and the efforts of U.S. intelligence to track such development. It could have been a great book and it is a shame that it turned out to be merely a good book.

Customer Reviews:

One of the most thoughtful, beautiful books on the Amish........1999-01-02

What more can I say? It is a warm book but not a sentimental one; the author realizes that while the Amish may have something to teach the rest of us, they are human, too. Her photographs are lovely. The text, written for adults, does not talk down to the reader, nor is it cheesy, as is true of the text accompanying many books of photos of the Amish and Mennonites. Altogether lovely.

Book Description

"Extremely readable recollections of the author... A rare testimony of a period of the history of 20th century mathematics. Includes very interesting recollections on the author's participation in the formation of the Bourbaki Group, tells of his meetings and conversations with leading mathematicians, reflects his views on mathematics. The book describes an extraordinary career of an exceptional man and mathematicians. Strongly recommended to specialists as well as to the general public." EMS Newsletter (1992) "This excellent book is the English edition of the author's autobiography. â€¦ This very enjoyable reading is recommended to all mathematicians."Acta Scientiarum Mathematicarum (1992)

Customer Reviews:

The recollections of a great mathematician.......2007-08-03

The title is a little misleading since there is not much math in the book, but a lot of personal stories about the intellectual life and travels of A. Weil. Through them we can glimpse his personality and thus the book will be interesting to mathematicians and historians of mathematics. The reader can detect a completely undogmatic mind, skeptical about justice and politics and with a rather ironic sense of humour. His stay in jail for not reporting for duty at the start of WWII was one of his most productive periods.

He recalls, but he is not able to give a concrete date, the day when H. Cartan and he founded Bourbaki. One of the funniest anecdotes is when Cartan receives a call from a Greek whose name is Bourbaki thinking it is a joke, but they become friends and he is even invited to some of their meetings.

A. Weil was not only an outstanding mathematician but a man of a wide culture and a polyglot. He studied sanskrit to read the great books of Indian literature and spent a couple of years in India. Another interesting story is when he is taken by a Russian spy in Finland and he is saved in extremis from execution by a chance meeting of Nevalinna with the chief of police.

He eventually moved to the US, although the first years must have been very frustrating teaching at second rates colleges where when he provided a proof the students would ask: "Is it going to be in the exam?"

The book ends in the fifties when he is appointed a professor at the University of Chicago after a stay in Sao Paulo.

To sum up, a fascinating personality that had a fascinating although not always easy life.

Light reading!.......2003-06-24

There is only a small number of autobiographies by mathematicians. Andre Weil was a giant in math. His autobio, written late in life, is fun to read. Weil has strong opinions that may perhaps not appeal to all. Even so, the book light reading, agreeing or not; and it fun too. For me it was a page-turner. To others perhaps a little pompous. Judge for yourself. While perhaps self-absorbed, I think Weil in his autobio gives personal and fresh insight into the tumultuous period in history, between the two World Wars in Europe, as it relates to math. The main part of the book covers Weil's life before he came to the US.
Weil had a monumental impact on math, and he also wrote some lovely history of math books, --number theory; and then of course some specialized books, that are corner stones in math, but not especially easy to read, at least for beginners. But Andre Weil is a central figure in math. His younger sister Simone Weil was an author and philosopher, and a political activist on the left in French politics in the 1930ties. She died young.

Light reading!.......2003-06-24

Quite some autocensorship.......2000-03-03

Weil did indeed lead a colorful life, and he certainly was a dominant figure in maths. But if one writes an autobiography, he should be honest when speaking both of his best and his worst. Unlike this, Weil strictly restrains from the reader the chapters of his life which he is not so proud of. I will name just two. First, in the book his wife (with a young son from her previous marriage) simply occurs in his life, and the reader is never told how and where they met, and who was the husband she abandoned because of this acquaintance (I here only comment that it was another French mathematician of the period, and earlier a friend of Weil, but he is not mentioned anywhere in the story). And second, his evading the military service; surely, most of us do not want to die, but to explain that we do not want to serve because we have a hinduistic view of the World is an overused trick (though perhaps it was not overused in those times). One so devoted to that view would definitely not feel at home in Princeton. In addition, in his well-known style Weil is extremely critical of the professional qualities of practically everyone, with exception of his "family" - the Bourbaki. Most of the textbooks by other people were awful, the knowledge of most other people catastrophically incomplete.

Still, there are some interesting facts for those who want to know what a life of a mathematician can involve, and two stars are justly earned. Perhaps this would have been a better book has it been written more in the spirit of Hardy's Apology, omitting the family matters and focusing on what the title promises.

Excellent!.......1999-08-03

Weil led a colorful, fascinating life. He became a well-known mathematician at an early age, and mastered several languages. Additionally, he traveled around the world, and narrowly escaped execution. His autobiography allows the reader to come to know him for himself, rather than for his work. If the reader pays close attention, he/she will see his subtle humor, which is cleverly woven in to his life story.

The Mathematician's Apprenticeship: Science, Universities and Society in England 15601640

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The Mathematician's Apprenticeship: Science, Universities and Society in England 15601640
Mordechai Feingold
Manufacturer: Cambridge University Press
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover

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